\u3ci\u3eSkelos v. Paterson\u3c/i\u3e: The Surprisingly Strong Case for the Governor\u27s Surprising Power to Appoint a Lieutenant Governor by Briffault, Richard
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2010 
Skelos v. Paterson: The Surprisingly Strong Case for the 
Governor's Surprising Power to Appoint a Lieutenant Governor 
Richard Briffault 
Columbia Law School, brfflt@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Briffault, Skelos v. Paterson: The Surprisingly Strong Case for the Governor's Surprising Power to 
Appoint a Lieutenant Governor, 73 ALB. L. REV. 675 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/915 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
ARTICLES
SKELOS V. PATERSON: THE SURPRISINGLY STRONG CASE
FOR THE GOVERNOR'S SURPRISING POWER TO APPOINT A
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
Richard Briffault*
On July 8, 2009, Governor David Paterson surprised New
York's legal and political world by announcing his intention
to appoint Richard Ravitch to fill the vacancy in the office of
lieutenant governor. No New York governor had ever
appointed a lieutenant governor before. Paterson's action was
widely denounced as unauthorized and unconstitutional.
Four months later, observers were even more astonished when
the Court of Appeals in Skelos v. Paterson upheld the
governor's action. This article explains why the governor and
Court of Appeals were right to conclude that the governor had
statutory and constitutional authority for his action. Indeed,
the case for the governor's action is quite straightforward and
surprisingly strong. That authority follows from the plain
text of a statute, the leading judicial precedent, and the
relevant provisions of the state constitution. By contrast, the
case against the governor's action was quite weak, relying
more on extra-textual and policy concerns than the law itself.
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 8, 2009, Governor David Paterson surprised New York's
political and legal world by announcing his intention to appoint
Richard Ravitch as lieutenant governor, thereby filling the vacancy
in that office created on March 17, 2008, when Governor Eliot
Spitzer resigned and Paterson, then lieutenant governor, became
governor. As Court of Appeals Judge Eugene Pigott later put it,
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
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when Paterson became governor, "no one gave a thought or
harbored a suggestion that he had the ability to appoint a
Lieutenant Governor."1  No provision of the state constitution
expressly authorizes the governor to appoint a lieutenant governor.
2
Instead, the constitution provides that "the temporary president of
the senate shall perform all the duties of lieutenant-governor" if
there is a vacancy in that office. 3 There have been at least ten
vacancies in the office of lieutenant governor, 4 and at no time before
July 2009 did a governor ever attempt to appoint a lieutenant
governor to fill the vacancy. 5 Indeed, at the time Governor Paterson
acted, the office of lieutenant governor had been vacant for fifteen
months and he had made no previous attempt to fill it. On the eve
of Governor Paterson's action, Attorney General Andrew Cuomo
announced that such an appointment was "not constitutional. ' 6 The
constitutionality of Governor Paterson's move was subsequently
denounced by a former chief judge, a former lieutenant governor, a
former attorney general, and a leading academic expert on the state
constitution. 7 When the inevitable court challenge resulted, a state
supreme court justice and a unanimous four-judge appellate
division panel in rapid succession held the governor's action
unconstitutional. 8
Skelos v. Paterson, 13 N.Y.3d 141, 154, 915 N.E.2d 1141, 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d 846, 852
(2009) (Pigott, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 157, 915 N.E.2d at 1150, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 854 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
3 N.Y. CONST. art. TV, § 6.
4 Judge Pigott's dissent in Skelos refers to ten prior vacancies that occurred in the
following years: 1811, 1828, 1829, 1847, 1885, 1910, 1913, 1943, 1973 and 1985. Skelos, 13
N.Y.3d at 161, 915 N.E.2d at 1153, 886 N.Y.S. 2d at 857 n.3 (Pigott, J., dissenting). There
was likely an additional, eleventh vacancy, however-that created on September 29, 1953, by
the resignation of Lieutenant Governor Frank Moore. Moore left office to become president
of the Government Affairs Foundation created by Nelson Rockefeller, who was ultimately to
run for governor. See Nicholas Webb, Finding Aid for the Frank C. Moore PAPERS, 1881-
1978, Biographical Note (July 2009), available at
http:/llibrary.albany.edulspeccoll/findaids/apap223.htm.
5 See Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 161, 915 N.E.2d at 1152, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 857 (Pigott, J.,
dissenting).
6 Statement of Attorney General Andrew Cuomo Regarding Lieutenant Governor
Appointment Proposal (July 2008), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/meidacenter/2009/july/july6aO.09.html.
7 See Brief of Gerald Benjamin, Peter J. Galie, Michael J. Hutter & Stan Lundine as
Amici Curiae at 11-13, Skelos v. Paterson, 65 A.D.3d 339, 885 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 2009) (No. 2009-00678), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad2/pdf/SkelosvPaterson/Hutter(Skelos%20v.%2OPaterso
n)080609-Brief.pdf (noting the opinions of former Chief Judge Wachtler, former Attorney
General Vacco, former Lieutenant Governor Lundine, and Jerry H. Goldfeder, the Chair of
the Committee on Election Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
8 Skelos v. Paterson, 25 Misc. 2d 347, 360, 884 N.Y.S.2d 812, 825 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
2009), affd, 65 A.D.3d 339, 348, 885 N.Y.S.2d 92, 98-99 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2009), rev'd, 13
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Yet the Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the governor's
appointment 9 -and the Court of Appeals was right. The governor's
action was authorized by the plain meaning of a state statute,
supported by judicial precedent, and consistent with both the text
and structure of the state constitution. The legal grounds for
challenging the governor's action were weak and inconsistent,
ultimately relying more on the arguments that "it's never been done
before" and extra-textual concerns about undue gubernatorial power
than legal texts. Although no constitutional provision expressly
authorized the governor's action, no constitutional or statutory
provision barred it, either. A gubernatorial action authorized by
statute and not precluded by the constitution or any other law is
presumptively valid.
The Ravitch litigation is a reminder that even when it comes to
constitutional questions, widely held but untested assumptions and
reliance on traditions and past practices (or the lack of them) is no
substitute for close and careful reading of the relevant
constitutional and statutory texts and case law. The fact that
something has never been done before may only mean that it
"present[s] an open legal question,"10 not that it is unauthorized or
prohibited.
The Ravitch litigation underscores the continuing importance of
the longstanding view of a state constitution as a limitation, and not
a grant of powers, so that the legislature has plenary authority to
exercise a power as long as it is not limited by the New York State
Constitution.11 So, too, the Ravitch dispute reminds us just how
problematic are some of our laws dealing with the filling of
vacancies in statewide elective office. One benefit of this dispute
could be closer attention to the vacancies issue. Certainly, the
scandals that engulfed Governor Paterson in early 2010 only
further underscored the value of having a lieutenant governor in
place and the uncertainty about gubernatorial succession removed.
N.Y.3d 141, 153, 915 N.E.2d 1141, 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d 846, 852 (2009). The state supreme
court opinion was issued July 21, 2009, less than two weeks after the governor's action. The
appellate division decision came down one month later, on August 20th.
9 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 153, 915 N.E.2d at 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
10 Id. at 153, 953 N.E.2d at 1146-1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 851 (2009).
11 See, e.g., RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 52 (7th ed. 2009) (noting that, with respect to state
constitutional jurisprudence, the legislature may embrace all powers not restricted by the
state constitution); see also ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 793-94 (3d ed. 1999) (summarizing the traditional view that state sovereign
power rests with the legislature pursuant to limitations imposed by the state constitution).
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Part II of this comment provides a brief chronology of the events
leading to Governor Paterson's naming of Richard Ravitch as
lieutenant governor, and of the litigation that followed. Part III
analyzes the legal issues raised by the governor's action. Part IV
concludes by considering the implications for state constitutional
law and for the specific question of filling vacancies in state office.
II. A TUMULTUOUS TERM: FROM THE ELECTION OF ELIOT SPITZER TO
THE JUDICIAL VALIDATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF RICHARD
RAVITCH
In November 2006, Eliot Spitzer, then the state attorney general,
and David Paterson, then a state senator and senate minority
leader, both Democrats, were together elected governor and
lieutenant governor of the State of New York by an overwhelming
65.7% of the vote.' 2 Less than fifteen months into his term,
Governor Spitzer, engulfed by scandal, resigned, and on March 17,
2008, Lieutenant Governor Paterson, by virtue of article IV, section
5 of the state constitution, 13 became New York's 55th governor.
14
Thereafter, the position of lieutenant governor remained vacant
until the summer of 2009. Article IV, section 6 provides that in the
event of a vacancy in that office, the temporary president of the
senate "shall perform all the duties of lieutenant-governor during
such vacancy."1 5 When Paterson became governor, the senate
majority leader and temporary president of the senate was Joseph
Bruno, a Republican. At that time, Senator Bruno became acting
lieutenant governor. 16 On June 24, 2008, Senator Bruno, also
buffeted by scandal, stepped down from his leadership post (he quit
the senate altogether on July 18, 2008)17 and Senator Dean Skelos,
another Republican, became majority leader, temporary senate
president, and acting lieutenant governor. ' 8 In the November 2008
12 Jonathan P. Hicks, Spitzer Vote Total Is Slightly Lower in Official Count, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2007, at B5.
13 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 5 ("In case of the removal of the governor from office or of his or
her death or resignation, the lieutenant-governor shall become governor for the remainder of
the term.").
14 Nicholas Confessore, Pledging Unity, Paterson Takes Albany's Helm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2008, at Al.
15 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
16 Nicholas Confessore, I Apologize to the Public, to Whom I Promised Better., N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2008, at B1.
17 Jeremy W. Peters, Bruno Says He Will Leave State Senate by Week's End, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2008, at B4; Danny Hakim, Bruno Declines Re-election Bid, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2008, at B1.
18 Danny Hakim & Jeremy W. Peters, New Day in Albany Opens as the Senate Selects
[Vol. 73.3
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elections, for the first time since 1965, the Democratic Party won a
majority of senate seats' 9 and on January 7, 2009, the Democratic
leader, Malcolm Smith, became senate majority leader, temporary
president of the senate, and, as a result, acting lieutenant
governor.
20
Senator Smith's hold on power was a precarious one, however.
His party held a slender 32-30 majority,21 and even before the
Democrats took control of the senate in January 2009, a group of
four Democrats had temporarily withheld their support from the
party leadership while they negotiated terms for their votes. 22 On
June 8, 2009, the Democratic majority broke apart as two
Democrats-Senators Pedro Espada and Hiram Monserrate-bolted
their party and joined the thirty Republicans in an effort to remove
Senator Smith as temporary president. 23 They adopted a resolution
electing Senator Espada temporary president and Senator Skelos
majority leader. 24 The rest of the Democratic Senators refused to
accept the legitimacy of this action and went to state supreme court,
Albany County, seeking a declaration that Smith was still
temporary president.25  That action was dismissed as an
"improvident intrusion into the affairs of the senate" by the court on
June 16.26 In the meantime, Senator Monserrate had returned to
the Democratic fold on June 15, leaving the senate evenly split
between two groups of thirty-one, each claiming control, including
the right to choose the senate's leadership and determine its
agenda. 27 During this period, it was unclear who was temporary
president of the senate and acting lieutenant governor-Senator
Espada or Senator Smith-so that it was unclear who could preside
Bruno's Successor, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at B1.
19 Nicholas Confessore, The Democratic Hand Waiting to Grasp the Senate's Gavel, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009, at A35.
20 Jeremy W. Peters, Role Reversal in the Senate, and Emotions Run High, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2009, at A27.
21 Brief of Defendant-Appellants at 11, Skelos v. Paterson, 13 N.Y.3d 141, 915 N.E.2d
1141, 886 N.Y.2d 846 (2009) (No. 2009-0183), 2009 WL 3362061.
22 Danny Hakim, Celebration Interrupted: 4 Dissidents Risk Democrats' Gain in Senate,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A27.




26 Id.; see also Smith v. Espada, No. 4912-09, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Albany County,
June 16, 2009), http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnow/pdf/Smith%20v.%20Espada%20.Revised.1
ast.pdf.
27 Skelos, 25 Misc. 3d at 351, 884 N.Y.S.2d at 819, affd, 65 A.D.3d at 348, 885 N.Y.S.2d at
98-99 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2009), rev'd, 13 N.Y.3d at 153, 915 N.E.2d at 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d at
852 (2009).
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over the senate or who would take over as governor should
Governor Paterson become incapacitated. 2
That 31-31 division persisted for nearly a month, leaving the
senate stalled and unable to do any business. 29 Mid-June 2009 was
a particularly unfortunate time for such deadlock. A number of
significant laws, including the one giving the mayor of New York
City control over the city's schools, were set to expire on June 30. 30
Similarly, a number of laws authorizing state and local taxes were
due to expire on June 30, and other laws authorizing new revenue
measures were needed by June 30th if taxes-essential for the local
revenue collections needed to balance local budgets-were to be in
place at the start of the local government fiscal year on July 1.
3 1
The senate was unable to take action on any of these measures.
32
Governor Paterson repeatedly called the senate into extraordinary
session to address these matters. The senate met in special session
eighteen times, with the two contending groups meeting separately
within the chamber, "gaveling in and minutes later gaveling out
without conducting any meaningful legislative business." 33 As a
result, tens of millions of dollars of state and local revenues were
lost, and "the tax structures and budgets of towns and cities across
the state were in shambles."34 The senate's failure to approve tax
measures required New York City to postpone the hiring of 250
police officers, 150 firefighters, 175 school safety agents, 150
crossing guards, and thirty-four emergency operators. 35 The state
comptroller estimated that the total direct cost of the senate
stalemate to the state and to local governments was $2.9 billion.
36
Moreover, on July 1, the old New York City Board of Education-
28 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 146-47, 915 N.E.2d at 1142, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
29 Id.
30 Editorial, New York's Defective Legislators, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2009, at A22.
31 Nicholas Confessore, Senate Inaction is Hurting Many Towns Across State, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2009, at A17.
32 See David King, As Time Runs Out, Paterson Tries to End the Deadlock, GOTHAM
GAZETTE, June 22, 2009, available at http://www.gothamgazette.com/print/2948.
33 Brief of Citizens Union of the City of New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellants at 2, Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d 141, 915 N.E.2d 1141, 886 N.Y.S.2d 846 (No.
2009-0183), 2009 WL 3362068.
n Brief of United Federation of Teachers, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-
Appellants at 1, Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d 141, 915 N.E.2d 1141, 886 N.Y.S.2d 846 (No. 2009-0183),
2009 WL 3362070.
35 James Barron, Senate Impasse in Albany Forces City to Impose Hiring Freeze, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2009, at A22; see also Brief of Citizens Union of the City of New York et al.,
supra note 33, at 29.
36 Press Release, Office of the New York State Comptroller, Cost of State Senate Inaction
to New Yorkers (July 2, 2009), available at
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/julO9/O70209factsheet.htm.
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defunct since 2002-sprang back to life, unsettling the governance
structure for New York City's public schools.
37
Finally, on July 8th, Governor Paterson moved to break the
senate impasse by naming Richard Ravitch-a distinguished senior
civic and business leader, who had previously served as chair of the
state Urban Development Corporation and as head of the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority-as lieutenant governor.
38
Under the constitution, the lieutenant governor not only presides
over the senate but can cast a "casting vote," that is, he can break
ties on procedural matters.3 9 Ravitch's appointment would have
enabled the senate to organize itself and get back to business.
Indeed, even though the legal status of Ravitch's appointment was
immediately clouded by litigation, and Ravitch was not cleared to
preside over the senate until the Court of Appeals's decision in late
September, the governor's action had an immediate effect. On July
9th, Senator Espada returned to the Democratic fold, giving the
Democrats a working majority in the senate 40 and making Malcolm
Smith once again temporary senate president.
Governor Paterson had barely announced Ravitch's appointment
when Senators Skelos and Espada sued to block Ravitch from
taking office. The two senators sought a temporary restraining
order from state supreme court, Nassau County, barring the
appointment.41 A temporary restraining order was issued on July
9th, but was vacated later the same day by the Appellate Division,
Second Department. 42  Thereafter the litigation moved swiftly
through three levels of the state judiciary. After briefing and oral
argument, Supreme Court, Nassau County, on July 22 granted a
preliminary injunction barring Ravitch from exercising any of the
powers of the office of lieutenant governor. 43 That injunction was
affirmed by a unanimous four-judge panel of the Appellate Division,
Second Department on August 20th.44 While the case was pending
37 Brief of Citizens Union of the City of New York et al., supra note 33, at 29.
38 Id. at 28.
39 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
40 Espada Returns to Democratic Party, Senate Gets Back to Work, NYLCOM, July 9, 2009,
http://nyl.com/-all-boroughs-news-content/top-stories/102009/espada-returns-to-democratic-
party/Default.aspx.
41 James T. Madore, LI Judge Blocks Ravitch from Lieutenant Governor Post, NEWSDAY,
July 22, 2009, at A06.
42 Id.
43 Skelos v. Paterson, 25 Misc. 3d 347, 361, 884 N.Y.S.2d 812, 826 (Sup. Ct. 2009), affd, 65
A.D.3d 339, 348, 885 N.Y.S.2d 92, 98-99 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2009), rev'd, 13 N.Y.3d 141, 153,
915 N.E.2d 1141, 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d 846, 852 (2009).
44 Skelos, 65 A.D.3d 339, 348, 885 N.Y.S.2d 92, 99, rev'd, 13 N.Y.3d 141, 153, 915 N.E.2d
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before the appellate division, Senator Espada dropped out, leaving
Senator Skelos to carry the challenge alone. Relying on somewhat
different reasoning and turning aside a host of technical questions
45
in order to resolve the central question of gubernatorial power, both
the supreme court and the appellate division concluded that the
governor's action was unauthorized by law and unconstitutional.
46
On September 22nd, a closely divided Court of Appeals reversed, in
an opinion by Chief Judge Lippman, joined by Judges Ciparick,
Read, and Jones. 47 Judge Pigott, joined by Judges Graffeo and
Smith, issued a strong dissent.
48
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS: WHY THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS RIGHT
A. The Case for the Governor's Power to Appoint a Lieutenant
Governor
The case for the governor's power to appoint a lieutenant
governor is surprisingly straightforward, relying on the plain
meaning of a state statute, clear judicial precedent, and state
constitutional provisions dealing with the lieutenant governor,
along with some traditional norms of statutory construction and
constitutional interpretation.
1. The Statutory Authorization
The statute is section 43 of the Public Officers Law, which
provides that when a vacancy occurs in an "elective" office,
''otherwise than by expiration of term," and there is "no provision of
law for filling" that vacancy, the governor "shall appoint a person to
execute the duties thereof until the vacancy shall be filled by an
election." 49 The office of lieutenant governor is an elective office.
The vacancy in it was created otherwise than by expiration of term.
And there is no other provision for filling that vacancy.
1141, 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d 846, 852.
45 See id. (holding that the case was properly brought in Nassau County and did not have
to be brought in Albany County; that a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the attorney
general was not the exclusive legal means available for testing the governor's authority to
appoint Ravitch to be lieutenant governor; and that two individual legislators had standing to
bring the claim against the governor).
46 See Skelos, 25 Misc. 3d at 360, 884 N.Y.S.2d at 825, affd, 65 A.D.3d at 348, 885 N.Y.S.2d
at 99. rev'd, 13 N.Y.3d at 153, 915 N.E.2d at 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (2009).
41 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 153, 195 N.E.2d at 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
48 Id. at 153, 915 N.E.2d at 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
49 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 43 (McKinney 2008).
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Other provisions of the Public Officers Law address the filling of
other vacancies. Section 41 provides a mechanism for filling
vacancies in the offices of attorney general and comptroller.
50
Section 42 provides generally for the filling of vacancies in elective
office, primarily by election, including special elections. 51 Section
42, however, specifically excludes the governor and lieutenant
governor from its scope. 52 With the office of lieutenant governor not
covered by section 41 and expressly excluded from section 42, it falls
within the "catchall"53 language of section 43.
2. The Precedent
The applicability of section 43 to the office of lieutenant governor
is confirmed by an older decision of the appellate division, affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, Ward v. Curran.54 The Ward case arose
after the death of Lieutenant Governor Thomas Wallace in 1943.
55
At that time, section 42 of the Public Officers Law did not contain
the exclusion of the office of lieutenant governor from its directive
that a special election be used to fill a vacancy in elective office-
that exclusion was added in response to Ward.56 The secretary of
state, however, resisted ordering a special election to fill the
vacancy created by Wallace's death.57 The attorney general agreed
with the secretary of state that an election was not needed.58 He
argued that section 42 did not apply to the office of lieutenant
governor, and that the question of vacancies in the office of
lieutenant governor was fully taken care of by the constitutional
provision authorizing the temporary president of the senate to act
as lieutenant governor in the event of a vacancy in that office.
59
According to the attorney general, with the temporary president so
acting, the office was not vacant and an election was not needed.
60




52 Id.; see also Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 148, 915 N.E.2d at 1143, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
53 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 148, 195 N.E.2d at 1143, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
54 266 A.D. 524, 526, 527, 44 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241-42 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1943), aff'd, 291
N.Y. 642, 644, 50 N.E.2d 1023, 1023 (1943).
55 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 162, 915 N.E.2d at 1153, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 858 (Pigott, J.,
dissenting).
56 Id. at 151, 915 N.E.2d at 1145, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 850.




61 Ward v. Curran, 266 A.D. 524, 526-27, 44 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241-42 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
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and the Court of Appeals agreed. 62 Although section 42 was
subsequently amended to exclude the lieutenant governor from the
special election provision, 63 the legislature did not so modify section
42's companion provision, section 43.
The Ward decision confirms the applicability of the Public
Officers Law vacancy-filling provisions to the office of lieutenant
governor even though the office is not specifically mentioned; it was
not mentioned in section 42 when Ward held that section 42 applied
to the lieutenant governor. Ward also confirms that the legislature
was aware of the fact that broadly-phrased Public Officers Law
provisions apply to the lieutenant governor when, after Ward, it
amended section 42 but not section 43. The interpretative canon of
"[m]eaningful [v]ariation," 64 and the related rule of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius65 indicate that the exclusion of the lieutenant
governor from one section of the Public Officers Law but not from
the next complementary section, section 43, was intentional. As the
United States Supreme Court once observed, "[w]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of the statute but omits
it in another... it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion."66  The Court of Appeals has similarly concluded that
"where the Legislature lists exceptions in a statute, items not
specifically referenced are deemed to have been intentionally
excluded."6 7
In light of Ward and these traditional canons of construction,
Chief Judge Lippman was plainly correct in concluding that "in
amending the Public Officers Law to remove the office of lieutenant
governor from the election mandate of Public Officers Law § 42, the
Legislature did not alter section 43, which, in the aftermath of
Ward is logically understood as applying to a vacancy in the
1943), affid, 291 N.Y. 642, 644, 50 N.E.2d 1023, 1023 (1943).
62 Ward, 291 N.Y. at 643-44, N.E.2d at 1023.
6 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 163-64, 915 N.E.2d at 1154, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
64 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 866 (4th ed. 2007).
65 N.Y. STAT. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1971) ("The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
is applied in the construction of the statutes, so that where a law expressly describes a
particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn
that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.").
66 Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (quoting Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
67 Weingarten v. Bd. of Trustees of N.Y. City Teachers' Ret. Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 575, 583, 785
N.E.2d 174, 179, 750 N.Y.S.2d 573, 578 (2002).
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lieutenant governorship."
68
3. The Constitutional Provisions
The Ravitch decision is also supported by two constitutional
provisions: the sentence of article IV, section 1, which was given its
current form as a result of an amendment to the constitution
adopted in 1953,69 and a sentence added to article IV, section 6 in
1945.70 The critical language in article IV, section 1 states:
The executive power shall be vested in the governor who
shall hold office for four years; the lieutenant-governor shall
be chosen at the same time, and for the same term.... They
shall be chosen jointly, by the casting by each voter of a
single vote applicable to both offices.
71
The key language in article IV, section 6 is: "No election of a
lieutenant governor shall be had in any event except at the time of
electing a governor."
72
These provisions that the governor and lieutenant governor "shall
be chosen at the same time, and for the same term,"73 and that the
lieutenant governor shall not be separately elected, 74 were added at
the request of Governor Dewey in direct response to the Ward
decision. 75 Dewey had been governor at the time of Lieutenant
Governor Wallace's death 76 and had been gearing up to run for
president in 1944. He had sought to avoid the special election
because it raised the possibility of a Democrat being elected
lieutenant governor and succeeding to the governorship in the event
Dewey won the presidency. 7 With the state senate safely in
Republican hands, having the temporary senate president serve as
the acting lieutenant governor, and succeeding to the governorship,
68 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 151-52, 915 N.E.2d at 1145-46, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 850. Subsection
(3) of section 42, which deals with the consequences of the failure to elect to any office in an
election held to fill a vacancy, and also expressly exempts the office of lieutenant governor,
provides further support for the expressio unius argument. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42(3)
(2008).
69 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (amended 1953).
70 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (amended 1945).
71 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
72 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
73 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
74 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
75 Skelos v. Paterson, 13 N.Y.3d 141, 163-64, 915 N.E.2d 1141, 1154, 886 N.Y.S.2d 846,
859 (2009) (Pigott, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 162, 915 N.E.2d at 1153, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 858 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
77 Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 49, Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 141, 915 N.E.2d 1141, 886
N.Y.S.2d 846 (No. 2009-0183), 2009 WL 3362063.
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was preferable.
Upset by the Ward decision, Governor Dewey "urged the
Legislature to begin the process of amending the constitution and to
change Public Officers Law § 42 to preclude an election for the office
of Lieutenant Governor .... The Legislature heeded the Governor's
call on both counts."78 Public Officers Law section 42 was amended
to exclude the lieutenant governor, 79 and the constitution was
amended, by the language just quoted, to bar the separate election
of the lieutenant governor.
As Governor Dewey explained in his Messages to the Legislature
concerning the amendment to article IV, section 1:
Executive responsibilities in our government are so
interwoven that the election of a Governor and a Lieutenant
Governor politically opposed to each other involves serious
problems.
... [T]here is a great advantage in being able to entrust
many of the complex administrative tasks of the Governor to
an able Lieutenant Governor.... This would not have been
possible if the Lieutenant Governor was required, as a
matter of party loyalty, to lead the minority party. 80
As amended, article IV establishes the principle that the governor
and lieutenant governor are partners, united by "party loyalty" and
a common purpose, with the governor entitled to "entrust many of
the complex administrative tasks of [state]" to his teammate, the
lieutenant governor.81  As Governor Dewey put it, "[g]ood
government requires responsible cohesive administration."
8 2
Gubernatorial appointment of a lieutenant governor to fill a
vacancy in that office, pursuant to Public Officers Law section 43, is
entirely consistent with the structure established by article IV,
sections 1 and 6, making the governor and lieutenant governor
political teammates and enabling the governor to look to a loyal
lieutenant governor for assistance. It is certainly far more
consistent with this constitutional vision than leaving the acting
71 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 163, 915 N.E.2d at 1154, 886 N.Y.2d at 859 (Pigott, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
79 Public Officers Law, ch. 3, 1944 N.Y. Laws 3 (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. OFF.
LAW § 42 (McKinney 2008)).
80 Thomas E. Dewey, Governor's Messages to the Legislature, Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Joint Election, S.I. 13, reprinted in 1953 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATiVE ANNUAL
318-19 (1953).
SI Id. at 319.
82 Id.
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lieutenant governorship in the hands of a legislator, like Senator
Bruno or Senator Skelos, who is the leader of the opposition party in
the senate, or in the hands of someone like Senator Espada, who
displays no discernable party loyalty at all.
Taken together, then, the case for the governor's action is
extremely clear. Public Officers Law section 43 gives the governor
authority to make an appointment to fill a vacancy in elective
offices, including lieutenant governor. Ward v. Curran confirms
that the Public Officers Law applies to the office of lieutenant
governor,8 3 and traditional canons of interpretation require the
conclusion that by amending section 42 to exclude the lieutenant
governor without so amending section 43, the legislature intended
the lieutenant governor to be covered by section 43. So, too,
gubernatorial appointment fulfills the vision expressed by the post-
Ward constitutional amendments that the lieutenant governor is to
be the governor's political partner.
B. Rejecting the Unpersuasive Case Against the Governor's Power to
Appoint a Lieutenant Governor
The case against the governor's power to appoint a lieutenant
governor is more complex, relying on inconsistent and insubstantial
theories, strained readings of the relevant legal texts, and
ultimately on non-textual policy arguments. These arguments can
be boiled down to six points: (1) section 43 does not apply because
the office of lieutenant governor is not elective; (2) section 43 does
not authorize gubernatorial appointment; (3) section 43 does not
apply because the office of lieutenant governor is not vacant; (4)
section 43 is invalid because the legislature's authority to enact the
vacancy-filling measure is based on article XIII, section 3 of the
constitution, and section 43 is inconsistent with that provision of
the constitution; (5) gubernatorial appointment is inconsistent with
"the elective principle";8 4 and finally, (6) the governor cannot make
an appointment because no governor has ever made such an
appointment before.
The first and second points are flatly inconsistent with the
83 See Ward v. Curran, 291 N.Y. 642, 643, 50 N.E.2d 1023, 1023 (1943). The conclusion
that the Public Officers Law applies to the lieutenant governor-unless the office is
specifically excluded-is buttressed by section 31, which is part of the same article as section
43. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 31 (McKinney 2008). It is article 3 which deals with the creation
and filling of vacancies, and expressly provides the procedure for the resignation of the
lieutenant governor as part of the article's general treatment of resignations. See§31(1)(a).
84 See infra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
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governing texts. The third and fourth points have some merit, but
the third fails to account for the constitution's specific language
while the fourth relies on an unduly crabbed reading of the
constitutional text. The fifth point is inconsistent with the claim
that the lieutenant governor is not elected,8 5 and is belied by the
constitution's prohibition of a special election for lieutenant
governor. The final point is not a legal argument at all. These
points are addressed below.
1. Lieutenant Governor Is an Elective Office
The principal argument addressed by the supreme court, Nassau
County against the governor's power to act pursuant to section 43 is
that the "office of lieutenant-governor is not an 'elective office'
within the meaning of § 43" since the lieutenant governor is elected
on a joint ticket with the governor.8 6 But that is nonsense. The
constitution provides for the election of a lieutenant governor.
8 7
This argument was dropped even by the appellate judges who
opposed the governor.88 Chief Judge Lippman's opinion for the
Court of Appeals properly assumed without discussion that the
lieutenant governor is an elective office.8 9
2. Section 43 Authorizes the Governor to Fill Vacancies in Elective
Office
The second contention, discussed by both the appellate division
and the Court of Appeals, that section 43 does not actually
authorize the governor to fill vacancies, 90 is equally nonsensical. To
be sure, it relies on the language of section 43, which provides that
"the governor shall appoint a person to execute the duties" of the
offices to which it applies, and does not say something like "shall
appoint someone to fill the vacancy."91  But this hyper-technical
85 Senator Skelos's Court of Appeals brief contended both that the governor's action
"violated the elective principle," and that "the office of Lieutenant Governor is not an elective
office." Brief for Plaintiff-Respondents, supra note 77, at 31, 57-60.
86 Skelos v. Paterson, 25 Misc. 3d 347, 360, N.Y.S.2d 812, 825 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
2009), affd, 65 A.D.3d 339, 348, 885 N.Y.S.2d 92, 98-99 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2009), rev'd, 13
N.Y.3d 141, 153, 915 N.E.2d 1141, 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d 846, 852 (2009).
87 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
88 The argument was not, however, dropped by Senator Skelos's lawyers. See supra note
85.
89 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 148, 915 N.E.2d at 1143, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
90 Skelos, 65 A.D.3d at 347, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 98, rev'd, 13 N.Y.3d at 149, 915 N.E.2d at
1144; 886 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
91 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 43 (McKinney 2008); see also Skelos, 65 A.D.3d at 347, 885
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argument ignores the fact that section 43 is titled "filling other
vacancies," much as section 41 is entitled "vacancies filled by
legislature" and section 42 is entitled "filling vacancies in elective
offices." 92  Plainly, the legislature assumed that all three
consecutive sections within the article of the Public Officers Law
entitled "creation and filling of vacancies" dealt with filling
vacancies. Although the title of a legislative section is not
controlling, it is surely relevant to the interpretation of the
statute. 93 Moreover, this argument is not limited to the office of
lieutenant governor, but potentially could be used against the power
to appoint to fill a vacancy in any elective office covered by section
43, in effect nullifying the statute. Again, Chief Judge Lippman
was plainly correct in treating section 43, with sections 41 and 42,
as part of a package of "vacancy-filling provisions."
94
3. The Office of Lieutenant Governor Was Vacant
The claim that section 43 is inapplicable to the lieutenant
governor position because there is no vacancy to fill is somewhat
more substantial. The constitution directs that in the event of a
vacancy in the office of lieutenant governor, "the temporary
president of the senate shall perform all the duties of lieutenant-
governor during such vacancy." 95 Arguably, then, the office is not
vacant. But "perform[ing] the duties" is not quite the same thing as
filling the vacancy. The distinction is highlighted by comparing this
language with the provision of the constitution directing that, in the
event of the governor's death, resignation, or removal from office,
the lieutenant governor "shall become governor for the remainder of
the term."96  By that language, the lieutenant governor fills the
vacancy in the office of governor. By contrast, the temporary
president of the senate is merely acting as lieutenant governor.
The difference between filling a vacancy and merely acting as
lieutenant governor is underscored by the fact that the lieutenant
governor gives up his former post to become governor while the
temporary senate president remains temporary senate president
while "perform[ing] the duties" of lieutenant governor. Dual office-
N.Y.S.2d at 98, rev'd, 13 N.Y.3d at 159, 915 N.E.2d at 1150-51, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
92 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 41-43.
93 ESKRIDGE ET. AL., supra note 64, at 862-63.
94 See id. (espousing a method of statutory interpretation that interprets each section "in
the context of the whole enactment").
95 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
96 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
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holding is highly unusual in our system, and the presumption ought
to be that the temporary senate president is merely "perform[ing]
the duties" of lieutenant governor, not actually becoming lieutenant
governor. So, too, the identity of the person "perform[ing] the
duties" of lieutenant governor can keep changing. There were four
people "perform[ing] those duties" between 2008 and 2009--Joseph
Bruno, Dean Skelos, Malcolm Smith, and Pedro Espada. This is
hardly consistent with any one of them filling the vacancy. In
addition, the temporary president of the senate's "perform[ance of]
the duties" of lieutenant governor raises the uneasy possibility that
he will be able to cast two votes in the senate-his own vote as a
senator, and, in the event of a tie, the casting vote of the lieutenant
governor. 97 With a 31-31 or even a 32-30 senate, the prospect of a
tie and a casting vote by the senate majority leader/acting
lieutenant governor is not at all farfetched. Then-Majority Leader
Joseph Bruno chuckled at a 2008 forum that he would be "happy to
have two votes."9 8 Double-voting is even more troubling than dual
office-holding. While the constitution may be read to permit it in
this instance, given the problematic nature of double-voting it
makes sense to treat the authorization of double-voting as only a
temporary measure, rather than one locked in for the duration of
the lieutenant governor's term.
These concerns growing out of the temporary senate president's
continuing role in the senate while also acting as lieutenant
governor confirm that the better reading of article IV, section 6 is
the one adopted by the Court of Appeals majority, that the
temporary senate president does not fill the vacancy but provides
"only stopgap coverage of the function of the Lieutenant
Governor." 99 As Chief Judge Lippman's opinion explained:
Properly understood, then, the two provisions-article IV, § 6
and Public Officers Law § 43-are complementary rather
than duplicative and, accordingly, article IV, § 6 should not
be construed, as it was by the Appellate Division, as a
limitation upon gubernatorial appointment pursuant to
97 N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
98 Senator Joseph L. Bruno, Remarks at the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of
Government, Gubernatorial Succession and the Powers of the Lieutenant Governor: A Public




99 Skelos v. Paterson, 13 N.Y.3d 141, 149, 915 N.E.2d 1141, 1144, 886 N.Y.2d 846, 849
(2009).
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Public Officers Law § 43. 100
4. Application of Section 43 to the Office of Lieutenant Governor Is
Not Inconsistent with Article XIII, Section 3.
Probably the strongest argument against the governor's action is
the one based on article XIII, section 3. That provision authorizes
the legislature to
provide for filling vacancies in office, and in case of elective
officers, no person appointed to fill a vacancy shall hold his
or her office by virtue of such appointment longer than the
commencement of the political year next succeeding the first
annual election after the happening of the vacancy. 101
Article XIII, section 3 is apparently the source of the legislature's
authority to enact the vacancy-filling provisions of the Public
Officers Law, but its requirement that the appointee filling a
vacancy cannot serve "longer than the commencement of the
political year next succeeding the first annual election after the
happening of the vacancy" 10 2 is arguably inconsistent with the
governor's power to appoint a lieutenant governor to fill out the
remainder of the lieutenant governor's term. The language
suggests that any appointee's term should have ended after the
2008 election as the lieutenant governor position became vacant in
March 2008, or for an appointment made in July 2009, the 2009
election.
But this argument is also unpersuasive. The constitution does
not define the term "political year." All it says, in article XIII,
section 4, is that "[tihe political year and legislative term shall begin
on the first day of January,"10 3 but that does not indicate which
January-2009, 2010, or 2011-or whether, given section 4's focus
on the legislative term, that the "political year" is the same for all
offices. Certainly, it is not the general case that appointments to fill
vacancies in elective offices are good only until the first of January
in the year after the appointment is made. Indeed, that is not the
rule for filling any of the vacancies in statewide office. Section 42
(4-a) of the Public Officers Law provides that if a vacancy occurs in
the elective office of United States Senator in an even-numbered
year within sixty days before the annual primary day, which is
100 See id. at 146, 915 N.E.2d at 1142, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
10, N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 3.
102 Id.
103 N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
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usually in September, the governor can appoint someone who will
serve until "the third day of January in the year following the next
even numbered calendar year."10 4  In other words, someone
appointed, say, "in late August 2010, would serve until January
2013, or nearly two and a half years,"'1 5 while "someone appointed
in an odd-numbered year would hold office until 'the third day of
January in the next odd numbered calendar year."'106 Thus,
pursuant to section 42 (4-a), Senator Kirsten Gillibrand's
appointment could last "nearly two years."'
10 7
Section 41 of the Public Officers Law goes even further,
authorizing "the Legislature to fill vacancies in the elective offices of
Attorney General and Comptroller for the duration of the vacant
term."108 Therefore, Comptroller DiNapoli's legislative appointment
in early 2007 means his term will not expire until January 2011,
lasting almost four years. 109
Therefore, "[i]n light of the uncertain meaning of 'political year' in
the context of filling vacancies in statewide offices,""10 like United
States Senator, attorney general, and comptroller, and given the
'same time, same term' provision of Article IV, § 1,"" it is
probably best to treat the term "political year" for appointment to
fill the vacancy in the office of lieutenant governor, as one that runs
with the Governor's and Lieutenant Governor's constitutional four-
year term of office. That would be consistent with the legislature's
power to appoint an attorney general or comptroller for the duration
of those offices' four-year terms, as well as with article IV's evident
desire to treat the governor and lieutenant governor as a team. 112
The Court of Appeals was, thus, consistent with longstanding
state practice in holding that the purpose of the political year
provision is "to assure that appointments to elective offices extend
no longer than is reasonably necessary to fill such offices by
election." 1 3  Given article IV's directive that the lieutenant
governor can be elected only at an election for governor, article XIII
104 Brief of Citizens Union of the City of New York et al., supra note 33, at 19 (quoting N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW § 42(4-a) (McKinney 2008)).
105 Id. at 19.
106 Id. (quoting N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (4-a) (McKinney 2008)).




-1 Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
112 Id.
113 Skelos v. Paterson, 13 N.Y.3d 141, 150, 915 N.E.2d 1141, 1144, 886 N.Y.S.2d 846, 849
(2009).
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would be satisfied if the appointive term ran until "the next election
at which the office may be legally filled." 114 Consistent with the
"whole act" rule,1 5 this nicely and appropriately harmonizes the
relevant constitutional provisions and also reflects "the main object
of article XIII, § 3, expressed unequivocally in its first clause, which,
of course, is to assure that vacancies are filled.""1
16
5. The "Elective Principle" Does Not Bar a Gubernatorial
Appointment
Diametrically opposed to the claim that section 43 does not apply
because the lieutenant governor is not elected is the argument that
gubernatorial appointment violates the so-called "electoral
principle." This argument was put forward with great rhetorical
force by the plaintiffs and by Judge Pigott's dissent. Judge Pigott
stressed that the appointed lieutenant governor could succeed to the
governorship in the event of the latter's death or resignation with
"the possibility exist[ing] that the citizens of this state will one day
find themselves governed by a person who has never been subjected
to scrutiny by the electorate."
117
In early March 2010, with Governor Paterson mired in scandals,
Judge Pigott's concern proved prescient, but the legal argument
that an "electoral principle" limits the appointive power is weak.
The "electoral principle phrase" draws on language in the Ward
opinion, which in turn quoted an earlier case, to the effect that "[i]t
is a fundamental principle of our form of government than a
vacancy in an elective office should be filled by election as soon as
practicable after the vacancy occurs."118 But whatever the power of
the "elective principle" idea in Ward, it was displaced by the people
and the legislature when the constitution and the Public Officers
Law were amended to bar a special election to fill a vacancy in the
office of lieutenant governor. As the Court of Appeals put it, "the
elective principle, upheld by the judiciary in Ward, was thus
legislatively subordinated to assure the structural integrity and
114 Id. at 150, 915 N.E.2d at 1145, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
115 ESKRIDGE ETAL., supra note 64, at 862.
116 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 150, 915 N.E.2d at 1144-45, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
117 Id. at 153, 915 N.E.2d at 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
118 Ward v. Curran, 266 A.D. 524, 526, 44 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1943),
affd, 291 N.Y. 642, 644, 50 N.E.2d 1023, 1023 (1943). (quoting Wing v. Ryan, 255 A.D. 163,
167, 6 N.Y.S.2d 825, 829 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1938), affd, 278 N.Y. 10, 10, 17 N.E.2d 133, 133
(1938)).
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efficacy of the executive branch."119
The elective principle, including the filling of vacancies in elective
office by election is, of course, a sound idea. But for a host of
offices-attorney general and comptroller, whose vacancies are
filled by legislative selection; the office of United States Senator, for
which the governor can make a two-year appointment followed by a
special election; and all the elective offices covered by section 43-
the elective principle has been superseded by other provisions.
1 20
As the Court of Appeals explained, "[r]ules of
succession are ... inevitably imperfect and ... invariably
compromise elective principles."
121
The elective principle objection is, thus, really a policy argument
which must fall given the many constitutional and statutory
provisions that accept, or require, other means of filling vacancies.
6. The Fact That No Governor Before Ever Sought to Appoint a
Lieutenant Governor Is Irrelevant
Even more than the elective principle, the central concern driving
Judge Pigott's dissent, and much of the opposition to the governor's
action, is that the appointment of a lieutenant governor is
"unprecedented."122  Judge Pigott stressed that on "at least 10
occasions since the first New York Constitution was adopted in
1777 ... the position of Lieutenant Governor has been vacant, but
no Governor has ever seen fit to assert that he had the power to
appoint a Lieutenant Governor to fill the vacancy."1 23  For the
governor's opponents and the Court of Appeals dissenters, the
objection was two-hundred-and-thirty years of non-action.
Judge Pigott's dissent overstates the history of non-action. New
York did not adopt a four-year term for governor and lieutenant
governor until 1938, so that for more than 160 years the lieutenant
governor served for a two-year term (or in some periods a three-year
term). With that shorter term, some period of vacancy in office
might have been acceptable. Also, for at least two different eras,
legislation provided for filling the vacancy by election, and two
119 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 151, 915 N.E.2d at 1145, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
120 Brief of Citizens Union of the City of New York et al., supra note 33, at 19-20 (citing
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW§ 42(4-a), which specifies the procedure for filling a vacancy in the office
of United States Senator from N.Y.).
121 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 153, 915 N.E.2d at 1146, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
122 Id. at 153, 915 N.E.2d at 1146, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 851 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 153, 915 N.E.2d at 1147, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
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vacancies-in 1847 and 1943- were filled by election. 124
As a result, the relevant period for non-action is just the roughly
six decades since the post-Ward amendments to the Public Officers
Law and the constitution. During that time, there were three
vacancies in the office of lieutenant governor prior to the present
one-in 1953, 1973, and 1985. When the first two vacancies
occurred, the senate was controlled by the same party as the
governor, so there was no partisan conflict between the governor
and the acting lieutenant governor. 125 The only time in modern
New York history when the lieutenant governorship was vacant and
the governor and temporary senate president were of opposing
political parties was the not-quite two-year period between the
resignation of Lieutenant Governor DelBello in February 1985 and
the end of the term to which he had been elected in December
1986.126 That is not an overwhelming negative precedent against
the governor's action.
More importantly, "the mere fact that a constitutional power has
not been exercised does not prove the power does not exist."127 A
power may exist but lie dormant until circumstances remind us of
its existence and justify or require its use. The objection from lack
of prior use is like the claim about the elective principle-ultimately
not a legal argument at all. Judge Pigott acknowledged this when
he observed "the fact that no Governor has previously attempted to
appoint a Lieutenant Governor ... does not resolve the legal
issue."128 It just shows that prior governors-and, in some sense,
really just Governor Mario Cuomo in 1985-either did not think
they had the authority, or for political reasons, chose not to exercise
the authority they had. But that is not much of a reason to discount
a statute plainly supplying the necessary authority.
In short, the plain meaning of section 43 of the Public Officers
Law, supported by the Ward decision and the legislature's post-
Ward exclusion of the lieutenant governor from section 42 but not
section 43, provided the authority for the governor's action, which
was congruent with article IV's structural commitment to a vision of
the governor and the lieutenant governor as political partners. The
124 Id. at 161, 915 N.E.2d at 1152, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 857. As was suggested at supra note 4,
there were probably eleven such vacancies.
125 Id. at 161 n.3, 915 N.E.2d at 1153 n.3, 886 N.Y.S.2d 857 n.3 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
126 Nancy Connell, Lundine Only Wants a Portion of the Job, Would Seek Senate Reprieve,
TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 24, 1986, at Al.
127 In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 688 A.2d 288, 291 n.1 (R.I. 1997).
128 Skelos, 13 N.Y.3d at 166, 915 N.E.2d at 1155, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 860 (Pigott, J.,
dissenting).
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internal objections to the use of section 43-that the lieutenant
governor is not "elective" and that section 43 does not authorize the
filling of vacancies-are specious. The constitutional objections-
that article IV effectively fills the vacancy with the temporary
senate president, and that a gubernatorial appointment of a
lieutenant governor is inconsistent with article XIII's "next election"
language-are more substantial, but also fail. The text of article IV
indicates that the temporary senate president only performs the
duties and does not fill the vacancy, while the fact of dual office-
holding and the prospect of double voting support the need for
someone to actually fill the vacancy. The practice reflected in other
vacancy-filling statutes is to treat the "next election" requirement to
mean the next election at which the office may be legally filled. The
"elective principle" and "unprecedented" arguments were
rhetorically the most potent, but were really no more than policy
arguments and, as such, inadequate to modify the plain meaning of
the statutory text.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article will conclude with two points, one about state
constitutional interpretation, and the other about filling vacancies
in state offices.
A. State Constitutional Interpretation
One reason why the governor's action and the Court of Appeals's
decision upholding it came as such a surprise to many legal and
political observers is that they approached the problem as if it were
a question of federal constitutional law, not state constitutional law.
It is a longstanding rule of constitutional interpretation that,
whereas Congress must justify its actions in terms of one of the
specific enumerated powers granted to it by the United States
Constitution, the state legislature has plenary authority to make
laws unless it is specifically limited by the state constitution. This
grant-versus-limitation distinction was most famously articulated
by nineteenth century jurist and scholar Thomas McIntyre Cooley
in his book, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, which
observed:
We look in the Constitution of the United States for grants of
legislative power, but in the constitution of the State to
ascertain if any limitations have been imposed upon the
complete power with which the legislative department of the
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State was vested in its creation .... [T]he State legislature
has jurisdiction of all subjects on which its legislation is not
prohibited. 129
This grant-versus-limitation distinction, and its implication that
a state legislature may act unless limited by its constitution,
continues to be part of state constitutional law today. 
130
From the state constitutional perspective, then, the key question
is not the one asked by Judge Pigott: Is there anything in the
constitution authorizing the governor's action? That might be the
central issue in a federal constitutional dispute. In a state case, the
question is whether anything in the constitution barred the
legislature's decision to give the governor the power to make an
appointment to fill the vacancy. The Court of Appeals's decision is
consistent with this approach and reminds us of its significance.
B. Filling Vacancies in State Office
The Ravitch litigation also reminds us just how problematic our
laws governing the filling of vacancies in statewide elective office
are, and just how much the law has departed from the "elective"
principle. As of March 2010, of the six statewide elective offices-
governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, comptroller, and
New York's two United States Senators-four are occupied by
individuals who were not elected to them. Three-Lieutenant
Governor Ravitch, Comptroller DiNapoli, and Senator Gillibrand-
were not elected at all, but were appointed to their positions. The
case of Comptroller DiNapoli is particularly egregious. He was
appointed by the legislature pursuant to Public Officers Law section
41 on February 7, 2007 to complete the term-which started on
January 1, 2007-to which Alan Hevesi had been elected in
November 2006.131 DiNapoli's term runs until the end of 2010. In
other words, for forty-seven of his forty-eight-month term, we will
have an unelected comptroller. Senator Gillibrand, who was
appointed on January 26, 2009, will not face the voters until
November 2010, so she will have more than twenty-one months in
129 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 355 (8th ed. 1927).
130 See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 11, at 52; (discussing the state
constitution's role as a limitation on legislative power and the factors that differentiate state
from federal constitutional power); WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 577-80 (noting, inter alia,
that powers not restricted by the state constitution remain with the state legislature).
131 Michael Cooper, Legislators Pick a Comptroller, Defying Spitzer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2007, at Al.
Albany Law Review
office without an election. Lieutenant Governor Ravitch will
actually hold the shortest unelected time in office-just eighteen
months from his appointment until the end of 2010.
Nor do these appointments reflect broad support from the
institutions of state government. Senator Gillibrand, like
Lieutenant Governor Ravitch, was appointed by Governor Paterson
unilaterally. While the "teammate" model of governor-lieutenant
governor relations adopted by the state constitution provides some
support for this, there is no reason for a United States Senator to be
the partner of the governor. And while the appointment of the
comptroller-like the appointment to fill a vacancy in the office of
attorney general-is nominally by the entire legislature, the much
greater size of the assembly relative to the senate means that, as a
practical matter, these appointments are made by the assembly
and, ultimately, determined by the assembly leadership. 132
Those who were troubled by the departure from the "elective
principle" and the unilateral power vested in one state official,
reflected by the appointment of Lieutenant Governor Ravitch,
should examine the vacancy-filling provisions more broadly. Surely,
there is no reason for the office of comptroller to be held by an
appointee for four years. Nor was there any reason there could not
have been a special election for United States Senator in 2009,
rather than 2010. Although an appointment may be a necessary or
desirable "stopgap" until an election can be held, there is no need
for these stopgap periods to last so long. And, if the law is going to
permit an appointee to hold office for two or four years, there is a
good case for requiring the participation of more branches of
government-the governor and both houses of the legislature-in
some of these decisions.
The events following the Court of Appeals's decision have served
to underscore both the political benefits of its action and the need
for further attention to the question of filling vacancies. As readers
of this article know, the political tumult that followed Governor
Spitzer's resignation and the June-July 2009 senate stalemate did
not end with Lieutenant Governor Ravitch's appointment. On
February 9, 2010, the senate, by a 53-8 vote, expelled Senator
Monserrate for misconduct growing out of an incident of domestic
violence. Until a special election set for mid-March to fill his seat,
132 It comes as no surprise that the last two statewide officials appointed pursuant to
section 41 of the Public Officers Law-Comptroller DiNapoli and G. Oliver Koppell, who was
appointed attorney general in 1994 to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Robert
Abrams-were both members of the assembly when they were appointed.
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that left the Democrats with a 31-30 margin in the senate and,
thus, without an actual majority. On February 26, 2010, amid an
outcry over his participation in an effort to a persuade a woman
who had brought charges of domestic violence against one of his
closest aides to drop her case, Governor Paterson ended his
campaign to be elected to a full term and called on the attorney
general to investigate the case. On March 3, 2010, the governor's
legal difficulties worsened when the Commission on Public Integrity
charged him with violating the state's ethics laws for soliciting and
securing free tickets to the first game of the 2009 World Series from
the New York Yankees, and found that he had given false testimony
to the Commission while under oath. The Commission referred
these charges to the attorney general and the Albany County
District Attorney for further investigation. From the vantage point
of early March 2010, with the governor facing calls for his
resignation, with the possibility of impeachment not out of the
question, and with the senate lacking a clear majority party, the
value of having an undisputed full-time lieutenant governor in place
and ready to take over as governor should the need arise could not
be clearer.
New York's ongoing political turmoil underscores the need for a
careful and comprehensive consideration of our laws for filling
vacancies in office. One added benefit of the Skelos v. Paterson
decision is that we now know that curing the "democracy deficit" in
our vacancy-filling laws does not require the extraordinary effort of
a constitutional amendment, but can be accomplished by ordinary
legislation. Although Governor Paterson's appointment of Richard
Ravitch as lieutenant governor was characterized by critics as a
gubernatorial power-grab, Paterson relied entirely on authority
given to him by the legislature. If the legislature thinks section 43
gives him too much power, it can take it back.
So, too, if the legislature thinks that the better approach to filling
the vacancy in the office of lieutenant governor is to follow the
model provided by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution for filling a vacancy in the office of vice
president-presidential nomination subject to confirmation by both
houses of Congress-the legislature can do S0.133 As we have
learned, Judge Pigott was right to worry that an unelected
lieutenant governor could become an unelected governor. Requiring
a lieutenant governor appointee to secure the approval of the
13 U.S. Const. amend. XXV (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)).
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legislature would surely give the appointee enhanced legitimacy,
both as lieutenant governor and as a potential future governor. The
legislation should give serious consideration to reforming the
lieutenant governor appointment process. From that perspective,
Skelos v. Paterson should not be read-or not read only-as an
endorsement of gubernatorial power. It is an affirmation of
legislative authority as well.
